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MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER,
ACCOUNTABLEAGENC~ AND
CRIMINAL ACTS
ROBERT F. SCHOPP*
I. INTRODUCTION
Smedley Wormwood is an accountant who is indicted for embezzling
funds from the company for which he works. He generally presents an
impression of an unobtrusive, conventional, compliant, "vanilla" individual.
When his lawyer interviews him about the charges, Smedley seems
innocent, frightened, and bewildered. In discussing the details of events
around the time of the alleged crime, Smedley becomes somewhat vague
and then admits to some lapses in recall. Smedley then startles the lawyer
by apparently undergoing a marked change in attitude, tone of voice, and
apparent self-identity. The lawyer realizes that she is now discussing the
crime with a confident, angry, arrogant client who identifies himself as
Slick and announces that he took the money this time, just as he has before.
Slick describes prior crimes of various types and laughs about the
possibility that "the worm" will be convicted and punished for this episode.
A clinical evaluation results in the diagnosis of dissociative identity
disorder ("DID"), more traditionally referred to as multiple personality
disorder.\ Wormwood experiences two states of consciousness. He holds a
job as an accountant, rents an apartment, and carries on the mundane affairs
of life as Smedley. At certain times, however, he takes on the consciousness
of Slick, the psychopathic personality who engages in a variety of types of
exploitative and criminal behavior. While Smedley is anxious, compliant,
and passive, Slick is confident, arrogant, and aggressive. Smedley has no
awareness of Slick or of conduct performed as Slick. Smedley is sometimes
embarrassed by lapses in memory and by episodes in which he finds
himself in strange places or encounters unfamiliar people who seem to
know him. Slick is aware of Smedley and of Smedley's experience. Slick
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perceives Smedley's experience from the perspective of an observer, and he
despises "the worm."
Reported cases occasionally address the significance of DID for
criminal responsibility.2 Courts and commentators debate the proper
approach to this question without arriving at any consensus. Most often,
this dispute addresses the most appropriate manner in which to apply the
insanity defense or some alternative criteria of criminal responsibility.3
Reflecting upon the criminal responsibility of defendants who engage in
criminal conduct while manifesting DID provides an opportunity to
examine three more general issues. The first involves the exculpatory
significance of impaired consciousness as it occurs in DID or in other
disorders. Second, this analysis might inform the conception of accountable
agency represented by the voluntary act requirement included in the
standard legal criteria of criminal responsibility. Third, this analysis
demonstrates that in order to understand the exculpatory significance of a
particular type of psychopathology, one must integrate description and
explanation of the specific pattern of functional impairment with the
principles of political morality underlying the applicable criteria of criminal
responsibility.
Courts and commentators present several interpretations of the legal
significance of DID for criminal responsibility. These interpretations reflect
different analyses of the psychological and legal relationships among the
individual with DID and the component personalities.4 I argue here that the
most defensible approach addresses the individual with DID, rather than
any component personality, as the proper subject of criminal responsibility.
This approach most consistently integrates the clinical impairment of
consciousness manifested in DID with the current structure of criminal
responsibility. This argument defends the following theses. First, to the
extent that DID exculpates criminal defendants, it does so for the same
reasons that support the exculpatory significance of impaired consciousness
more generally. Thus, a satisfactory analysis of DID and criminal
responsibility must address DID as a disturbance of consciousness. Second,
the exculpatory significance of impaired consciousness ordinarily applies to
the criteria of responsibility traditionally represented by the act, or
voluntary act, requirement rather than those represented by the insanity
defense. Third, this interpretation reflects the concept of accountable
2 See, e.g., ELYN R. SAKS WITH STEPHEN H. BEHNKE, JEKYLL ON TRIAL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY
DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW 120-28 (1997); Sabra M. Owens, Criminal Responsibility and Multiple
Personality Defendants, 21 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 133, 134-37 (1997).
3 See, e.g., SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 2-5; Owens, supra note 2, at 134. See generally
JENNIFER RADDEN, DIVIDED MINDS AND SUCCESSIVE SELVES 125-42 (1996) (discussing multiple
personality disorder and culpability in criminal law).
4 See discussion infra Part m.
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agency relevant to legal criteria of criminal responsibility in a liberal
society.
Part II of this Article provides a brief description of the contemporary
understanding of DID. Part ill sketches the most common approaches
adopted by courts and commentators to the evaluation of the criminal
responsibility of defendants manifesting DID, and Part IV raises three
important questions regarding these approaches. Part V advances an
alternative pattern of analysis intended to address the three questions raised
in Part IV. Part VI applies this pattern of analysis in order to explain the
significance of DID and of impaired consciousness generally for criminal
responsibility and for the underlying conception of accountable agency.
Part VII concludes the analysis.
For the sake of consistency, this article adopts the following
terminology. "DID" refers to the clinical syndrome as sketched above and
commonly described by various clinical nomenclatures and commentators.
"Multiple" refers to an individual, such as Wormwood, who manifests
fragmentation of consciousness qualifying for the clinical diagnostic
category of DID. "Alter" refers to a relatively well-organized and consistent
state of consciousness that the multiple experiences as a distinct or
independent person, personality, or entity. The "host" is the alter that
represents the multiple in the mundane activities of daily life. In many
cases, the multiple takes on the host consciousness more often than any
other, but mere duration does not define the host. The host represents those
portions of the individual's experience and consciousness that do not elicit
the problematic or frightening emotional responsiveness around which
other alters are organized. A particular alter is "out" or "in control" when
that state of consciousness commands the multiple's body. Alters "switch"
when one alter replaces another as the alter that currently commands the
body.
II. DISSOCIATIVE IDENTITY DISORDER
The description and incidence of DID remain controversial. Although
some have framed this controversy as one about the existence of DID, it
might be more fruitfully understood as a dispute about the diagnostic
validity and clinical usefulness of the usual formulation of DID. That is,
some commentators question whether the current formulation of DID
provides an accurate or illuminating description of the pathology
manifested by those who receive the diagnosis. Critics raise at least three
different questions regarding the current formulation of DID. First, some or
all of those diagnosed with DID might malinger the disorder, or certain
aspects of it, particularly in circumstances raising questions of criminal
300 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 10:2
responsibility. Second, the disorder might represent an iatrogenic response
to expectations or suggestions from certain clinicians. Third, although some
individuals diagnosed with DID might suffer from significant dissociative
disorders, the current formulation of DID might not accurately portray the
impairment manifested by these individuals.s In addition, on the assumption
that some individuals suffer from a disorder roughly similar to the current
formulation of DID, individuals who receive the diagnosis might vary
significantly regarding the precise nature of their impairment, including
collateral psychopathology.6
This Article does not attempt to resolve these questions. Rather, it
proceeds on the premise that the current formulation of the disorder
provides at least a roughly accurate and minimally adequate description of
a pattern of impairment suffered by some people who engage in criminal
conduct. According to the current formulation, DID is a dissociative
disorder in which an individual manifests fragmentation of consciousness.
Ordinary consciousness involves a relatively consistent and integrated
awareness of one's self, one's environment, and the relationship between
the two.7 DID has traditionally been referred to as multiple personality
disorder because the individual develops at least two distinct aspects of
consciousness identified as personalities or alters. Each of these alters
considers himself or herself a distinct person, personality, or entity.8
Commentators usually designate one of these alters as the host, although
the criteria that qualify an alter as the host are not entirely consistent.
Frequently, the identified host is the personality that controls the person's
body and presents itself to the outside world more often than any other alter
and during the periods of relatively mundane daily functioning.9 The other
alters often represent some relatively strong and potentially conflicting
emotional state such as anger, aggression, or sexuality. These alters are
emotionally organized and driven in that they represent experiences,
memories, and behavioral dispositions associated with a particular
S Compare August Piper, Jr., Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility: Critique
ofa Paper by Elyn Saks, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 7, 11-19 (1994) (arguing that the central features of
multiple personality disorder are not well-defined), with SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 21-38
(discussing the arguments and evidence for and against the existence of multiple personality disorder
and arguing that the law should recognize multiple personality disorder). See generally Symposium. 27
J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 367-705 (1999) (discussing the interrelationship between factitious behavior,
dissociative disorders, and the law).
6 See CAROL S. NORTH, JO-ELLYN M. RYALL, DANIEL A. RiCCI, & RiCHARD D. WETZEL,
MULTIPLE PERSONALITIES, MULTIPLE DISORDERS: PSYCHIATRIC CLASSIFICATION AND MEDIA
INFLUENCE 44-45 (1993).
7 See LAWRENCE C. KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 26-28 (9th ed. 1977).
8 See DSM-IY, supra note 1, at 484-85,487; SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 9.
• See FRANK W. PuTNAM, DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER
107 (1989); SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 11.
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emotional state in relative isolation from the comprehensive set of
, psychological characteristics that comprise an intact consciousness.1o
Fragmented consciousness lies at the core of the disorder in that people
who suffer from DID experience an array of emotional states, memories,
and behavioral dispositions similar to those experienced by people not
suffering from DID, but they experience some of these psychological states
as encapsulated within relatively distinct compartments of consciousness.
Thus, they experience these psychological states and tendencies without the
context of a more comprehensive set of psychological characteristics
ordinarily provided by integration of awareness. ll Wormwood, for example,
represents a relatively simple division of consciousness in that he performs
most of the ordinary tasks of daily life in the state of consciousness
identified as Smedley. As Smedley, Wormwood is not aware of intense
angry and aggressive emotional states and behavioral tendencies. When
these responses become intense, Wormwood experiences an alternative
state of consciousness identified as Slick. In this state of consciousness,
Wormwood experiences and indulges his anger in relative isolation from
the moder~ting influence of those aspects of his consciousness
encapsulated in the identity of Smedley. When Wormwood experiences the
host identity of Smedley, he is unaware of the experiences and conduct
associated with Slick. When he experiences the alternative identity of Slick,
he is aware of the personality traits and behavior of Smedley, but he does
not experience these as aspects of himself. Rather, he interprets these as
belonging to a different being whom he despises and to whom he refers as
"the worm."
More complex variations of DID can include any number of alters,
each of which usually represents some central emotional state and each of
which becomes active in circumstances that elicit that type of emotional
responsiveness. The alters can vary significantly in the manner and degree
to which they are aware of the experience and behavior associated with the
other alters and in the degree and manner in' which they can influence
conduct performed as another alter.12
Clinical case descriptions vary markedly regarding a number of
important factors. Reports indicate that alters vary widely in the degree to
which they are conscious of each other's,experience and that multiples vary
in the degree to which they can deliberately manage the process of
Iv See Piper, supra note 5, at 12-13. See also PuTNAM, supra note 9, at 103-06 (describing the
characteristics of alter personalities); COLIN A. Ross, M.D., MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER:
DIAGNOSIS, CLINICAL FEATuREs, AND TREATMENT 108-25 (1989) (discussing the different types of
alter personalities in patients with multiple personality disorder).
II See Ross, supra note 10, at 86-90; Nicholas Humphrey & Daniel C. Dennett, Speaking for Our
Se11'es: An Assessment ofMultiple Personality Disorder, 9 RARITAN 68, 70 (1989).
12 See PuTNAM, supra note 9, at 114-15.
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switching states of consciousness in order to address specific situations.13
Clinical accounts also indicate that some multiples manifest significant
collateral psychopathology, including psychotic process, in certain states of
• 14
conscIOusness.
Wormwood represents a caricature of DID in the sense that he
represents a simple case of the central defining characteristics of the
disorder. He experiences only two clearly defined alters, and the Smedley
alter is amnestic for the experiences of Slick. Wormwood manifests no
serious collateral impairment of psychological capacities in either alter.
Thus, Wormwood provides an uncomplicated case of DID that facilitates
reflection on the exculpatory significance, if any, of the type of impairment
that provides the defining criteria of DID. IS In contrast, some who suffer
from DID might also manifest psychotic process in certain states of
consciousness, but the exculpatory significance of their pathology might
rest upon that collateral psychotic process, rather than upon the impairment
that supports the diagnosis of DID.
III. DID AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Courts and commentators adopt several approaches to the assessment
of the criminal responsibility of defendants who manifest DID. Courts
frequently apply the insanity standard to the alter that was in control at the
time the offense was committed.16 Under the most common forms of the
insanity defense, courts conclude that defendants are criminally responsible
if the perpetrating alters understood what they were doing and that their
conduct was wrong in the sense of being illegal or contrary to social
standards. Most defendants with DID who commit crimes would be
convicted under this approach because DID does not involve any major
impairment of reality testing or reasoning.17 A court that adopted this
approach would conclude, for example, that Wormwood was guilty if Slick
understood that he was taking money from his employer and that this
conduct was illegal or contrary to social standards of acceptable conduct.
Alternately, a court might apply the criteria of insanity to the host. IS
According to some accounts of DID, multiples tend to concentrate angry,
aggressive, or antisocial emotions and dispositions in their alters rather than
in their hosts, and their hosts are usually unaware of these alters and their
" See id. at 117-23.
" See NOJITH ET AL., supra note 6, at 5Q.-52. See also PuTNAM, supra note 9, at 57-70 (discussing
psychiatric, neurological, and medical symptoms of alters).
IS DSM-IV, supra note 1, at 487.
16 See SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 124-25; Owens, supra note 2, at 134-36.
17 See Owens, supra note 2, at 137.
18 See SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 126-29; Owens, supra note 2, at 137.
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conduct.19 In these circumstances, the application of insanity standards to
the host would result in acquittal because the host would have been
unaware of the criminal conduct.20 Wormwood, for example, would engage
in illegal conduct as Slick, without any awareness by Smedley. Thus,
Smedley would not have known the nature and quality of the conduct.
Some who accept the principle that the state cannot justifiably convict
and punish an alter who was unaware of the criminal conduct at the time it
was committed would endorse an approach that would exculpate the
defendant with DID if any alter was unaware of that conduct. According to
this approach, the presence of at least one innocent alter would preclude
conviction and punishment because conviction and punishment of the
defendant with DID would inflict that conviction and punishment upon an
innocent alter. If one accepts this approach, conviction requires serial
application of the insanity defense or other criteria of criminal
responsibility to all alters. According to this "innocent alter" approach, the
state can convict the multiple defendant only if all alters fulfilled criteria of
criminal responsibility in some form.21
The perpetrating alter, host, and innocent alter approaches can generate
markedly different results in any particular case. At a more abstract level,
however, they share a common pattern of analysis. All three approaches
adopt a "molecular" pattern of analysis in that all three treat Smedley and
Slick as distinct foci of legal responsibility. Each of these approaches
adopts a molecular pattern of analysis in that they each apply the criteria of
responsibility to one or more alters, rather than to the multiple as a complex
entity. They diverge in that they select different alters or combinations of
alters as the subjects of analysis, and this difference generates different
verdicts. The perpetrating alter approach finds that Slick fulfills the
requirements of criminal responsibility and thus, that Wormwood is guilty.
The host and innocent alter approaches find that Smedley does not fulfill
the requirements of criminal responsibility and thus, that Wormwood is not
guilty.
" Humphrey & Dennett, supra note 11, at 70. See also PuTNAM, supra note 9, at 104-15
(describing different types of alter personalities and their awareness of each other).
" See. e.g., United States v. Denny-Schaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1013 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
defendant was not guilty of kidnapping because host personality was not in control at the time of the
offense). See also SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 131 (discussing the standard set in Denny-
Shaffer).
" See generally SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 106-20, 132-34 (discussing the flaws in the
Denny-Shaffer case and situations when individuals suffering from multiple personality disorder should
be held responsible for their crimes).
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IV. THREE QUESTIONS FOR THE MOLECULAR APPROACH
Consider three questions regarding the molecular pattern of analysis.
First, who manifests DID? Slick might fulfill the requirements of antisocial
personality disorder in that he has engaged in an extended pattern of
conduct that violates the law and the rights of others. Slick might also meet
the diagnostic criteria for psychopathy in that he demonstrates an inability
to experience empathy, inhibitory emotions, and personal attachments.22
Slick demonstrates no evidence of fragmented consciousness, however, nor
does he experience amnesia. Similarly, Smedley might qualify for some
diagnostic categories involving anxiety, but he manifests no evidence of
impaired consciousness.23 Smedley reports some lapses in recall. According
to the molecular approach, however, Smedley's failure to recall Slick's
experience is not amnesia because amnesia involves loss of memory for
one's own experience. Neither Smedley nor Slick demonstrates any loss of
memory for his own experience.
It might seem natural to say that Wormwood manifests DID, but to
whom does ''Wormwood'' refer? The molecular approach attributes conduct
and mental states relevant to the criminal charge to either Smedley or Slick.
Since all waking periods of Wormwood's life occur in the consciousness of
Smedley or of Slick, what counts as the psychological characteristics of
Wormwood? One might refer to Smedley and Slick collectively as
"Wormwood;' as one might refer to John and Mary Smith as "the Smiths."
It would be very odd, however, to attribute DID or any other form of
personal psychopathology to "the SmithS:'24
Alternately, one might argue that we can and should individuate
persons differently for legal and clinical purposes. According to this
interpretation, Smedley and Slick are the proper subjects of criminal
responsibility, but Wormwood is the proper subject of clinical diagnosis
and treatment. This line of argument merely rephrases the question. Under
the molecular approach to criminal responsibility, alters are the entities
subject to evaluation for criminal responsibility. Why would pathology
suffered by any entity other than the subject of criminal responsibility
affect the analysis? As usually understood, the insanity defense exculpates
certain defendants because those individuals suffer from psychological
22 See generally DSM-IV, supra note 1, at 645-50 (discussing antisocial personality disorder);
ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBI'lG WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS AMONG Us
33-82 (1993) (discussing the characteristics of the psychopath).
23 See generally DSM-IV, supra note 1, at 393-444 (discussing anxiety disorders).
24 Clinicians sometimes speak of pathological relationships, and in some cases it might be
appropriate to say that the Smiths interact in such a manner as to manifest a pathological relationship.
These diagnostic categories attributed to relationships constitute a separate type of relational
malfunction, however, precisely because they address pathological patterns of interaction among
persons rather than psychopathology of the person.
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disorders giving rise to certain excusing conditions. It does not excuse them
because some other individuals suffer such impairment.25 If alters are the
subjects of evaluation for criminal responsibility, then either Smedley or
Slick must manifest the pathology that gives rise to the claim of
exculpation.
Second, if one accepts the molecular approach, why would one think
DID raises any problem of criminal responsibility? Slick clearly fulfilled
the requirements of criminal responsibility, while Smedley clearly did not
because he neither engaged in criminal conduct nor was aware of any
criminal conduct. These circumstances raise a dispositional problem
because executing Slick's sentence would injure the innocent Smedley, but
they do not seem to raise difficult questions of criminal responsibility.
Smedley and Slick are not unique in creating such practical problems of
disposition. Consider, for example, criminals who provide the sole support
for their children, corporate entities, and major shareholders in
corporations. In each case, executing the sentence may cause severe injury
to innocent children, shareholders, or employees respectively. These
circumstances raise perplexing problems for the criminal justice system,
but they do not represent difficult determinations of criminal responsibility.
Suppose that Guido, a career criminal, realizes that a trail of evidence
will lead to his apprehension. He volunteers to save the life of the holy but
very ill Mother Beneficence by allowing the physicians to connect her
failing kidney to his own. When a rival gangster visits the hospital room to
taunt Guido, Guido draws a gun from under his pillow and kills the rival, to
the horror of Mother Beneficence. The police and prosecutor have clear
evidence that Guido committed the homicide, but they realize that
incarcerating him would require that the state either incarcerate Mother
Beneficence along with Guido or disconnect her from him, causing her
death.
These circumstances create a perplexing problem of disposition, but the
matter of criminal responsibility remains clear. Guido is guilty of the
murder of his rival, and Mother Beneficence is not. It seems highly unlikely
that anyone will think that the court encounters a difficult question
regarding the criminal responsibility of someone named "Guido-
Beneficence;' rather than a difficult dispositional problem. Under the
molecular approach to the criminal responsibility of those who manifest
DID, it seems that Smedley and Slick present the same type of case as that
2.< See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTlTUfE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 4.01
(Ofticial Draft and Revised Commentaries, 1985) [hereinafter MPC] (discussing standards for when an
individual should or should not be held responsible for his conduct when suffering from a mental
disease or defect); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 173(b) (1984) (discussing the
element of mental disease or defect in an insanity defense).
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presented by Guido and Mother Beneficence. In each case, one party is
clearly guilty and the other is clearly innocent. Authorities encounter a
dispositional problem because punishing the guilty party will inflict harm
on the innocent party. Yet, the two cases seem intuitively to raise different
concerns. These cases differ precisely because Guido-Beneficence elicits
unambivalent application of the molecular pattern of analysis yet this same
approach fails to capture the critical features of Wormwood's case.
Cases involving criminal conduct of defendants suffering from DID
initially appear interesting precisely because they raise the perplexing
problems of criminal responsibility expected to inform our understanding
of the complex issues and principles of criminal responsibility.26 Rather
than addressing these issues in a manner that informs our understanding of
the underlying principles and the broader category of cases involving
impaired consciousness, the molecular approach apparently dissolves the
questions regarding criminal responsibility. The cases seem to raise only
practical problems regarding disposition.
Casting these cases as difficult dispositional problems raises once again
the first question regarding the identity of the person who suffers from
DID. One common answer to this dispositional problem endorses civil
commitment to a mental health facility in order to protect the public and to
provide treatment for the multiple.27 Civil commitment, however, ordinarily
requires mental illness and dangerousness, and the molecular approach
renders it mysterious as to who fulfills these requirements.2S Some of
Slick's conduct may qualify as dangerous, although it is not at all obvious
that embezzlement so qualifies. There is no indication that Smedley has
engaged in dangerous behavior. Neither Smedley nor Slick manifests any
indication of DID. Furthermore, neither suffers from any other major
psychological disorder of a type that would ordinarily support civil
commitment.29
The host and innocent alter applications of the molecular approach
avoid the problem of subjecting an innocent alter to unjustified criminal
condemnation, but the molecular approach encounters an analogous, and
perhaps more severe, problem with commitment. On the host and innocent
alter applications of the molecular approach, DID frequently supports an
acquittal because criminal conviction would condemn and incarcerate at
least one innocent alter for the culpable criminal conduct of another. Civil
commitment would confine both alters, although neither would fulfill the
26 See SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 2-7. See generally RADDEN, supra note 3, at 125-42.
27 See SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 158-63; Owens, supra note 2, at 138.
~, See generally John Parry, Involuntary Civil Commitment in the 90s: A Constitutional
Perspective, 18 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REp. 320, 322-23 (1994) (discussing the different
criteria used for civil commitment throughout the country).
v See id. at 322-23.
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legal requirements that justify such confinement. Slick but not Smedley
might fulfill the dangerousness requirement, and neither manifests any
major psychological impairment that would fulfill the mental illness
criterion.
Third, suppose Smedley committed the crime. Would most people have
the same intuitive judgment of responsibility and the same concerns about
the justification of executing the sentence that they would experience if
Slick had committed the crime? Ordinarily, one would expect that criminal
conduct by a person suffering DID would occur when an angry, aggressive
alter commands the body. Smedley presents as a compliant individual
precisely because Wormwood's antisocial desires have become
encapsulated in his consciousness as Slick. It is conceivable, however, that
the ordinarily compliant Smedley might decide to embezzle in unusual
circumstances. Does the intuitive inclination regarding Wormwood's
criminal responsibility remain constant whether Wormwood commits the
crime in his consciousness as Slick or as Smedley? On the molecular
approach, there seems to be no reason to distinguish these two variations of
the story because in either case, one alter would be convicted and punished
despite not having participated in the crime.
In short, the molecular approach misconstrues these cases in two
important ways. First, it obscures the nature of the clinical impairment that
lies at the core of DID. The disorder involves severely fragmented
consciousness; addressing each alter as a distinct entity obscures this
fragmentation of consciousness. Rather than a form of psychological
impairment, DID appears to present a coordination problem among distinct
entities. Second, the molecular approach fails to engage the central legal
issue involving the significance of distorted consciousness for criminal
responsibility. It recasts the legal problem as a dispositional one regarding
the manner in which legal institutions should respond when holding one
entity criminally responsible will cause hardship to a distinct and innocent
entity.
v. THE ALTERNATIVE MOLAR APPROACH
A. THE MOLAR APPROACH
The molar approach addresses Wormwood as the subject of criminal
responsibility. Wormwood experiences two modes of consciousness in that
he experiences and behaves as Smedley and as Slick. These modes are not
entirely independent. Although Wormwood might have knowledge and
skills in each mode of consciousness that is not available to him in the
other, significant learning and knowledge permeates the boundaries among
308 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 10:2
alters.30 As-Smedley and as-Slick are aspects of Wormwood, so Wormwood
knows everything that falls within the awareness of each aspect, including
the nature and quality of the conduct he performs in either mode and that it
is illegal or wrongful in the sense relevant to criminal responsibility.
Does it seem to matter intuitively, however, for evaluation of guilt
whether Wormwood committed the crime as Smedley or as Slick? Does it
seem intuitively more or less justified to convict and punish Wormwood for
conduct performed as Smedley or as Slick? According to the original story,
Wormwood was puzzled and frightened because he was charged with a
crime that he had committed as Slick and regarding which he was unaware
as Smedley. Suppose, in contrast, that the investigation demonstrates that
Wormwood embezzled in his as-Smedley aspect of consciousness.
Wormwood became frustrated and angry because as Smedley he was
denied a raise he thought he deserved, so he decided to "give himself a
raise:' As Smedley, he embezzled money from his employer, telling himself
that he was not really stealing because the employer was taking advantage
of his loyalty. Slick merely looked on, commenting that "I guess the worm
ain't as holy as he claims:,31
B. COMPARE OTHER TYPES OF IMPAIRED CONSCIOUSNESS
As ordinarily understood, DID is a dissociative disorder of
consciousness.32 Unimpaired consciousness involves a relatively
comprehensive and well-integrated awareness of oneself, the environment,
and one's relationship to that environment. This relatively consistent and
well-integrated awareness of experience in relation to events in the
environment provides the individual with a unifying sense of self as an
identity that extends over time and circumstances.33 A variety of disorders
involve some disturbance of the ordinary integration of consciousness and
memory.34 Those who manifest DID develop compartmentalization of
consciousness such that they experience various events, behavior, and
" See PuTNAM, supra note 9, at 114-15; Humphrey & Dennett, supra note 11, at 70; Elyn R. Saks,
Does Multiple Personality Disorder Exist? The Beliefs, the Data, and the Law, 17 lNT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 43, 62--63 (1994).
" As-Slick is coconscious with as-Smedley, but he is not able to direct or intervene in the conduct
Wormwood performs as Smedley. Thus, as-Slick can'observe the embezzling, but as-Slick observes that
conduct as the behavior of an entity he understands as a distinct actor whom he identifies as Smedley or
"the WODD."
" See generally DSM-IY, supra note 1, at 477, 484-87 (discussing multiple personality disorder);
KAPLAN AND SADOCK'S SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY 638, 644-48 (Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J.
Sadock eds., 7th ed. 1994) [hereinafter KAPLAN & SADOCK] (discussing dissociative disorders and
multiple personality disorder).
" See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 32, at 638; KOLB, supra note 7, at 26-28, 151-52.
" See generally DSM-IY, supra note 1, at 477-91 (describing the general category of dissociative
disorders); KOLB, supra note 7, at 151-54 (describing several manifestations of disturbance of
consciousness).
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psychological responses and processes as occurring within distinct spheres
of consciousness referred to as alters or personalities. Rather than an
integrated identity that extends across time and experience, they develop
separate identities for various spheres of consciousness. This
compartmentalization of consciousness includes amnesia within certain
spheres of consciousness for at least some experience of the other spheres.35
Although this compartmentalization of consciousness and memory into
distinct spheres identified as personalities or alters represents the most
striking feature of DID, disorders other than DID reveal a similar
underlying pathology in that they also involve dissociation of the ordinarily
integrated functions of consciousness and memory. Consider, for example,
conduct performed in a state of impaired consciousness associated with an
epileptic seizure. Some individuals who suffer from epileptic seizures
perform simple or complex movements while experiencing clouded
consciousness associated with the seizures. These individuals occasionally
engage in violent behavior while unaware or only partially aware of their
conduct, their circumstances, and themselves. Due to dissociation of
ordinarily integrated aspects of consciousness and memory, they may
experience intense fear or anger and strike out at a nearby person without
conscious awareness of other relevant circumstances or of their own
extended set of beliefs, wants, interests, and principles.36
Some individuals suffer from a similar state of impaired consciousness
associated with hypoglycemia. During these periods of impaired
consciousness, they may engage in complex or aggressive behavior.37 A
similar phenomenon is said to occur with somnambulism.38 In one case, a
woman reportedly killed her daughter during a period of somnambulistic
distortion of consciousness.39 The woman is described as engaging in a
complex pattern of behavior during which she remained asleep, yet was
apparently sufficiently conscious of her immediate environment to leave
her bed, walk through the house to a woodheap, retrieve an ax, walk to her
daughter's bedroom, and deliver two accurate and deadly strokes.40
These disorders of consciousness share a common behavioral pattern
insofar as they involve organized, directed, apparently purposeful, and at
least partially environmentally responsive conduct. By all appearances, at
" See DSM-IV, supra note I, at 484-87; KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 32, at 638,644-48.
". See R. v. Sullivan, 2 All E.R. 673, 677 (H.L. 1983); G.M. Paul & K.W. Lange, Epilepsy and
Criminal Law, 32 MED. SCI. & L. 160, 163-64 (1992) (discussing R v Sullivan). See also ROBERr F.
SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANlTY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL REsPONSffiILITY: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 15D-51 (1991) (discussing temporal lobe epilepsy).
'" See, e.g., R. v. Quick, 3 All E.R. 347, 350 (C.A. 1973).
., See Norval Morris, Somnambulistic Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North Koreans, 5 REs
JUDICATAE 29, 29-30 (1951).
., See ill.
" Id. at 30.
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least some of those who engage in conduct while suffering these disorders
know what they are doing and act purposefully. Those who suffer from
these disorders also share a common type of impairment insofar as each
acts in a state of impaired consciousness precluding access to the
comprehensive set of beliefs, wants, interests, and principles that constitute
that person's identity as an accountable agent. Many people might say of
these defendants, "they were not themselves when they committed those
crimes." In saying that the person was not his or her self, however,
observers might not mean that the actor did not know what he or she was
doing or did not do it purposely but rather that the actor did not know
himself or herself. That is, those who engage in conduct while suffering
this type of impairment act without access to the comprehensive set of
psychological states that constitutes their extended identities.
C. COMPMffiYOURSEU
Think of yourself as an example of an ordinary person in stressful,
although not particularly unusual, circumstances. Try to imagine your
psychological experience of the situation, the manner in which you would
probably behave, and the relationship between these two aspects of your
responses. Imagine yourself getting out of bed on Monday morning with
pressing responsibilities awaiting when you arrive at work. As you attempt
to depart early for work, your kids are screaming and fighting, and you
argue with your spouse about which of you is responsible for getting the
kids ready for the school bus. When you finally leave the house, the traffic
is awful and you fall further behind schedule, arriving late for work. As you
arrive, your supervisor berates you for your late arrival on such a busy day.
The supervisor continues to criticize you throughout the very unsuccessful
day at work, and rush hour traffic renders your return commute more
stressful than usual. As you enter the house, you find that your spouse has
yet to return, the television is blaring, and the kids are fighting and
screaming.
You immediately feel your anger surge, and your first thought is, "I'll
pull the plug out of that damn TV, grab both kids by their throats, and
strangle them; that'll shut them up;' You immediately yank the plug out of
the wall, grab the kids by their arms, and propel them into their bedrooms.
You grit your teeth and repeat to yourself: "control yourself'; "you're
supposed to be the adult"; "you spoiled them"; "you'll feel awful later";
"don't make it worse"; "you'll get arrested." You limit your behavior to
propelling the kids into their bedrooms, rather than strangling them,
partially by verbally instructing yourself in ways intended to redirect your
conduct in a manner that avoids the most objectionable behavior or
consequences. Although you audibly mutter these self-instructions only in
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extremely stressful circumstances, the more general pattern of modifying
your conduct from that which would fulfill an immediate desire to that
which is expected to avoid adverse consequences or promote extended
interests is quite ordinary. You frequently forgo an opportunity to act upon
some immediate desire or impulse in order to pursue some extended goal,
interest, or value. Each of the phrases you mutter to yourself represents an
appeal to a long-term interest or principle of yours; that is, each reflects
your awareness of yourself as a person with an extended identity involving
a complex set of experiences, wants, interests, values, and relationships.41
Notice that although you restrained your impulse to strangle the kids,
you acted on your desire to yank the television plug from the walL That
desire elicited no apparent conflict with competing interests or principles.
Your first desire might have been to kick the television off the stand, but
that desire would immediately elicit awareness of how expensive it would
be to replace the television, leading you to instruct yourself, "don't-you'll
be sorry." The desire to kick the television elicits awareness of
countervailing interests which you use to resist the desire, but the desire to
pull the plug elicits no analogous awareness, so you pull the plug.
Finally, try to imagine what it would be like to experience the same
desires to kick the television off the stand and to strangle the kids in
isolation from any awareness of your other wants, beliefs, interests,
principles, and relationships; that is, without access to your sense of self.
Imagine a state in which you are aware only of the anger and the desire to
stop the blaring and screaming, dissociated from the other psychological
states and processes that constitute your sense of self and through which
you usually evaluate and redirect your anticipated conduct.
D. COMPARE WORMWOOD, OTHER TYPES OF IMPAIRED
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND YOURSELF
You experience the desires to pull the plug and to strangle the kids in
the context of your awareness of a complex set of information about your
circumstances and yourself. The circumstances include the immediate and
long-term situational factors such as ordinary emotional, interpersonal, and
institutional responses to your conduct and the likely effects of those
responses on your interests. Important information about yourself includes
your beliefs, wants, long-term interests, relationships, and principles. You
direct your conduct partially by considering its ramifications in light of
these considerations. Thus, your integrated consciousness of the complex
set of psychological experiences that constitutes your extended identity
., "Wants" suggests a broader sense of inclination than a felt desire, which generally suggests an
inclination that is relatively intense or emotionally laden; wants include but are not limited to felt
desires.
312 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 10:2
provides the resources with which you inhibit certain desires, modify your
intent, and direct your conduct.
The critical impairment in the dissociative disorders discussed
previously involves limitation or distortion of consciousness.42 Individuals
who suffer from from these disorders experience a limited and
nonrepresentative subset of the ordinary awareness of their environment
and of themselves, often in the context of strong emotional responsiveness.
These individuals lack awareness of those aspects of their circumstances
and of themselves, including their long-term interests, beliefs, relationships,
and principles, that ordinarily competent practical reasoners use in order to
inhibit and direct their behavior in a manner consistent with their sense of
self and with their understanding of the person they want to be or think they
should be. Thus, those who suffer from these disorders lack access to the
resources that most ordinary people use to inhibit certain strong immediate
desires in order to conform their conduct to social or personal norms.
People who suffer from DID resemble those who manifest other forms
of impaired consciousness and differ from those who lack clinical
impairment insofar as the central impairment of DID involves distortion of
consciousness that prevents them from interpreting and acting upon an
integrated awareness of themselves and their environment. When
Wormwood experiences his as-Smedley aspect of consciousness, he lacks
access to the segment of his consciousness compartmentalized as Slick.
When he experiences his as-Slick aspect of consciousness, he is aware of
the as-Smedley component but not as an aspect of himself. Wormwood-as-
Slick experiences Smedley as a separate entity he encounters and abhors.
This analysis is molar, rather than molecular, in that the subject of the
analysis is the multiple, rather than each alter. The distinction between the
molecular and molar patterns of analysis illuminates the important intuitive
differences among Guido-Beneficence, Wormwood, and ordinary people,
including you. Guido-Beneficence elicits clear intuitive judgments that
Guido is criminally responsible for the criminal conduct and that Mother
Beneficence is not criminally responsible for that conduct precisely
because each of them is and acts as an independent, intact consciousness
that initiates action as an independent accountable agent. These clear
intuitive judgments regarding responsibility reflect the unambivalent
., See supra notes 4-15 and accompanying text. The DSM-IV categorizes four specific disorders
as dissociative disorders and identifies the central feature of these disorders as disruption of the
ordinarily integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity or perception. See DSM-IV, supra
note 1, at 477-91. A number of disorders that are not listed in this category of the DSM-IV have
dissociative properties insofar as they share this central feature. The post-ictal stage of an epileptic
seizure, for example, can involve a period of disruption of the ordinary integration of consciousness.
Although this post-ictal state is not categorized under the diagnostic category of "dissociative disorder"
in DSM-IV, it is a dissociative disorder in this broader descriptive sense.
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intuitive inclination to apply the molecular pattern of analysis to Guido and
to Mother Beneficence.
Wormwood fails to elicit the same unequivocal intuitive attributions of
responsibility because as-Slick and as-Smedley do not represent
independent, intact centers of consciousness.43 Rather, they represent two
aspects of Wormwood's consciousness. If one thinks of as-Smedley and as-
Slick as two independent, intact centers of consciousness, analogous to
Mother Beneficence and Guido, it seems natural to apply the molecular
pattern of analysis. The molecular approach fails to provide a satisfactory
interpretation, however, because it generates the difficulties raised by the
three questions posed in Part IV. The molecular approach renders it
mysterious why one would think that the case involves an impairment of
consciousness or any problem regarding criminal responsibility.
The molar approach accommodates the intuitive inclination to say that
Wormwood suffers from impaired consciousness in the form of DID and
presents a difficult case regarding criminal responsibility. When
Wormwood embezzles money from his employer in his as-Slick state of
consciousness, he differs from Guido and from you when you desire to pull
the plug and strangle the kids. Guido and you each act as an independent,
intact consciousness. Guido exercises his consciousness in a manner
intended to avoid punishment for criminal conduct, and you exercise your
consciousness in order to redirect your inclinations within social and
personal constraints. Wormwood lacks access to the inhibitory interests and
principles that you call upon in order to inhibit your immediate desires and
to direct your conduct in conformity with social constraints and your own
long-term interests and values. If one applies the molecular analysis to
Wormwood, one loses sight of the central impairment of consciousness that
differentiates Wormwood from Guido-Beneficence and from you. Thus, the
molecular approach to Wormwood obscures the critical issues regarding the
type of impairment involved in DID and the significance of this type of
impairment for criminal responsibility. The following Section applies the
molar pattern of analysis to Wormwood in order to examine the
significance of DID for attributions of criminal responsibility.
E. WORMWOOD, DID, AND THE MOLAR APPROACH
According to the molar approach, criteria of criminal responsibility
apply to Wormwood rather than to Smedley or Slick. This Section contends
that the molar analysis and common intuitions converge insofar as each
supports exculpation for crimes committed by Wormwood in his as-Slick
.. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (discussing shared memory and learning among
alters as well as the distribution of affective responses among alters).
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aspect of consciousness but not for crimes committed by Wormwood in his
as-Smedley aspect of consciousness. Consider first the initial variation of
Wormwood's story as told in Parts I and n.44 Wormwood presents as
frightened and bewildered. From the molecular perspective, it seems
natural to say that Smedley is frightened and that it would be wrong to
punish him for Slick's crime. That approach generates the difficulties
previously discussed. From the molar perspective, Wormwood is frightened
and bewildered because Wormwood-as-Smedley does not recall the crime
he committed as Slick. The critical question is not whether society can
justly hold Smedley responsible for Slick's crime. Rather, the critical
question addresses the exculpatory significance, if any, of Wormwood's
fragmented consciousness for conduct he performed in the as-Slick aspect
of his consciousness.
When Wormwood acts as Slick, he lacks access to those aspects of self
(that is, of Wormwood) corresponding to those you use to inhibit your
unacceptable inclinations to strangle your kids. You refrain from acting on
those inclinations by appealing to the long-term wants, beliefs, interests,
and principles that constitute your extended identity. You appeal to your
interests when you remind yourself that: "you'll make it worse"; "you'll get
arrested." Wormwood-as-Smedley would remind himself: "you'll lose your
job"; "you'll get arrested." You appeal to the principles of responsibility
you have adopted as important components in your identity, "you're
supposed to be the adult." Wormwood-as-Smedley would remind himself of
his value for honesty, "you'd be a thief." The point is not, of course, that
you are perfectly responsible or that Wormwood-as-Smedley is perfectly
honest. Rather, these interests and principles constitute important
components of your extended identity, and you ordinarily make use of them
in inhibiting unacceptable desires. Similarly, Wormwood-as-Smedley
makes use of his inhibitory interests and principles in directing his conduct
in conformity with personal and social boundaries.
Like you, Wormwood incorporates such interests and principles into
the extended identity that he appeals to in directing his behavior. As
Smedley, he has conscious access to them for use in the process of practical
reasoning through which he decides to act. When Wormwood is in his as-
Slick mode of consciousness, however, he lacks access to these aspects of
consciousness as his. That is, Wormwood-as-Slick realizes that someone he
refers to as "the worm" endorses these interests and principles, but
Wormwood-as-Slick lacks consciousness of them as part of his extended
identity.45 Thus, fragmented consciousness prevents Wormwood from
.. See supra notes 1-2, 11-15 and accompanying text
" The clinical literature discusses alters that are aware of other alters but engage in behavior
expected or intended to have results contrary to the other alters' social, legal, or physical interests,
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appealing to his own complex set of interests and principles during the
process of practical reasoning. Ordinarily, competent adults, in contrast,
decide to engage in particular behavior in light of its likely effects on their
complex set of relevant interests and values.
Contrast that first variation of the story with the second one in which
Wormwood-as-Smedley is frightened because he has been caught
embezzling as Smedley due to his resentment at being denied the raise he
thought he deserved. Wormwood's as-Slick consciousness took no part in
the criminal conduct, merely observing the conduct performed as
Smedley.46 Wormwood-as-Smedley has access to the interests and
principles Wormwood ordinarily appeals to for inhibition of desires to act
in a manner contrary to law or social standards. The crime reflected
Wormwood's decision to act despite these aspects of self. That is, the crime
was "out of character" for as-Smedley, but Wormwood performed it with
access to the as-Smedley aspects of his character. Wormwood-as-Smedley
lacks access to the as-Slick components of his consciousness, but these are
not the aspects that Wormwood applies in order to conform to social and
legal constraints. Thus, Wormwood-as-Smedley was not deprived of any
assets that Wormwood or unimpaired people use to direct their conduct in
compliance with the law.
Wormwood might have committed the crime more effectively in the as-
Slick aspect of consciousness. However, psychopathology exculpates
because it undermines culpability, not because it reduces criminal
effectiveness. Psychopathology exculpates those who lack the capacities of
criminal responsibility by the systemic criteria of the normative institutions
within which their conduct is evaluated. It does not exculpate those who
lack criminal talent or skills. Impairment exculpates because it undermines
the systemic justification for punishing the defendant, not because it
increases his chances of getting caught.
This molar analysis is consistent with the standard account of the
development of DID. According to this standard account, alters represent
encapsulated segments of consciousness that develop to contain emotional
states and emotionally laden behavior that are not acceptable and safe in the
developmental circumstances. The host retains consciousness of those
aspects of experience that are safe, inhibitory, and compliant in relation to
sources of authority, power, or fear.47 Slick-type alters embody the angry,
aggressive, sexual or otherwise unacceptable aspects of experience that are
too dangerous to acknowledge in the formative circumstances. Smedley-
apparently indicating that alters can be aware of the other alters, but perceive them as distinct entities
with independent interests. See PuTNAM, supra note 9, at 108-D9; Ross, supra note 10, at 115.
•'. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text
" See Ross, supra note 10, at 57-76; Humphrey & Dennett, supra note 11, at 70.
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type alters embody the relatively safe, compliant, and inhibitory aspects of
experience and inclination. Neither alter is "really" Wormwood and neither
is a separate agent because each represents certain components of the
complete experience and consciousness of Wormwood.
Behavior performed by Wormwood-as-Slick reveals pathology that
exculpates, not because Slick suffers from pathology that exculpates, but
because Wormwood suffers from impairment in the form of fragmented
consciousness that exculpates Wormwood because it distorts his access to
the as-Smedley aspect of his consciousness. Thus, Wormwood's impaired
consciousness prevents him from applying the complex set of wants,
beliefs, interests, and principles that provide important components of his
identity, and that ordinary people apply in directing their conduct in a
manner that conforms to legal constraints. Criminal conduct performed by
Wormwood-as-Smedley is culpable, not because Smedley is culpable but
because Wormwood is culpable for behavior performed with access to the
interests and principles that serve the inhibitory functions for Wormwood
and for ordinary people. Wormwood-as-Smedley suffers from impaired
consciousness, but that impairment does not deprive Wormwood of access
to aspects of himself upon which Wormwood or ordinary people would rely
in order to conform to the limits imposed by law.
In addition to conforming to the standard account of the etiology of
DID, the molar approach comports with a preferred therapeutic goal of
integration into a unified consciousness.48 Successful therapeutic integration
would resolve the pathological fragmentation of consciousness and would
not raise concerns of illegitimate "homicide" or analogous offenses
regarding consenting or nonconsenting alters who fail to survive as distinct
centers of consciousness.49
In short, the molar analysis provides an account that integrates the
clinical understanding of DID with central normative intuitions regarding
the culpability of Wormwood, Guido-Beneficence, and ordinary people
who experience but resist the desire to engage in prohibited conduct. The
molar approach also provides answers to the three puzzling questions posed
in Part IV: First, it provides an interpretation according to which
Wormwood suffers from DID and constitutes the focus of criminal
responsibility as well as the potential subject of civil commitment. Second,
it provides an account of Wormwood's case accurately understood as one
.. See generally PuTNAM, supra note 9, at 197-217, 301-16 (discussing the different
psychotherapeutic techniques used in working with multiple personality disorder patients); Richard P.
Kluft, M.D., Clinical Approaches to the Integration of Personalities, in CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER 101-33 (Richard P. Kluft & Catherine G. Fine eds., 1993)
(discussing integration as a goal for the majority of multiple personality disorder patients).
49 See SAKS WITI! BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 63-66 (discussing whether integration is the equivalent
of murder).
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involving difficult issues of criminal responsibility, rather than merely
problematic disposition. Third, it explains the intuitive judgment that
Wormwood's criminal responsibility can vary according to whether
Wormwood commits the crime as Slick or as Smedley. Readers may differ
regarding their intuitive responses to crimes committed as Smedley or as
Slick, but at least the molar approach explains why criminal responsibility
can vary with the specific type of distorted consciousness represented by
different alters.
The analysis remains incomplete, however, because support for the
molar approach rests on a coherence argument in that it demonstrates that
this approach coheres with the clinical account of DID and with several
intuitive judgments about the responsibility of Wormwood, Guido-
Beneficence, and ordinary people. A critic might embrace the claim that the
molecular approach reframes these cases as instances of problematic
disposition rather than as difficult questions of criminal responsibility. This
critic might conclude that the initial impression that these cases involve
difficult issues of criminal responsibility was simply mistaken. This critic
would accept the molecular analysis and conclude that Slick is clearly
guilty, that Smedley is clearly innocent, and that these cases do not involve
important or perplexing concerns regarding criminal responsibility. Rather,
they raise difficult dispositional problems.
A satisfactory response to such a critic would advance a theoretical
justification for the molar analysis as a component of a defensible
institution of criminal responsibility. This theoretical justification would
support the interpretation of DID as raising difficult questions regarding
criminal responsibility and the application of the molar analysis to these
questions as demonstrated in Part V. This theoretical explanation for the
molar approach must provide a conception of accountable agency and an
interpretation of a criminal act as an exercise of such agency such that the
multiple, rather than an alter, constitutes the accountable agent.50 Although
commentators sometimes refer to metaphysical theories of personal
identity, the primary function of this theory of agency is normative.51 That
is, the theory of accountable agency must provide a conception of agency
as a component of a more comprehensive normative theory that justifies
subjecting accountable agents to criminal conviction and punishment. A
•,By a "criminal act," I mean an act that meets the voluntary act requirement of the MPC. In MPC
terms, an act is merely bodily movement, and the voluntariness provision requires that this bodily
movement stand in the appropriate relationship to the efforts and determination of the actor. Some
writers would include this "voluntariness" requirement within the conception of a criminal act. See
MPC, supra note 25, §§ 1.13(2),2.01. See generally SCHOPP, supra note 36, at 4-7 (discussing MPC
requirement of liability for a voluntary act).
<i See generally SAKS WITH BEHNKE, supra note 2, at 41-51 (discussing theories of personal
identity).
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metaphysical theory of personal identity advances this project only insofar
as it informs the normative theory of agency.
VI. ACCOUNTABLE AGENCY, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND
CONSCIOUSNESS
A. ACCOUNTABLE AGENTS IN THE PuBLIC JURISDICTION OF A
LIBERAL SOCIETY
An agent is one who acts, exerts power, or produces an effect.52
Accountable agents exert power or produce effects in a manner that
qualifies as accountable under some normative criteria. Legally accountable
agents are accountable according to the criteria specified by some legal
institution that embodies underlying principles of political morality that
govern that society. Principles of criminal responsibility in the United
States and other liberal democracies include criteria that reflect the
conception of accountable agency required to justify their holding a
defendant answerable to the criminal justice system.53
Legal systems in the liberal tradition establish institutions of political
justice that provide an institutional structure for social cooperation among
individuals who endorse a variety of comprehensive moral doctrines.54
These individuals might differ regarding important moral issues yet share
common principles of political morality that support a mutually acceptable
legal system.55 This legal system establishes and protects public and
nonpublic domains of jurisdiction. Individuals participate in the public
domain through the democratic political processes in order to establish
rules that regulate the public jurisdiction and protect the individual's
discretion to pursue a broad range of life plans within the nonpublic
domain.56 All liberal societies maintain a substantial domain of nonpublic
life beyond the government jurisdiction. Each competent adult has the
" I THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 248 (2d ed. 1989).
" This paper addresses accountable agency in the narrow sense that refers to the properties of
agency required to qualify conduct as a voluntary act in the sense that a voluntary act is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for criminal responsibility. See MPC. supra note 25, § 2.01. Some theorists
might prefer to develop a broader sense of accountable agency that includes all of the requirements of
criminal responsibility. If one understands the notion in that manner, this paper discusses only one
aspect of accountable agency. I address the narrower conception in order to attempt to understand more
clearly the significance of the voluntary act component of the requirements of criminal responsibility in
a liberal society.
5< See ROBERT F. SCHOPP, JUSTIFIcmON DEFENSES AND JUST CONVICTIONS §§ 3.3.1-3.3.2, at
65-71 (1998), for a more detailed discussion of this normative framework.
" See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM §§ 1-3, at 4-22 (1993) (referring to religious, moral,
or philosophical comprehensive doctrines). I refer to all of these as moral doctrines in order to include
those systems or aspects of systems that people rely on to address moral questions regarding how we
ought to live.
S> See id. § 6, at 35-40.
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liberty to direct his or her life in the nonpublic domain through individual
decisions and voluntary relationships with others. Thus, each competent
adult exercises self-determination in a liberal society by participating as an
equal in the political processes of the public domain and by exercising
sovereign discretion in the nonpublic domain.57
Individuals qualify for equal standing in the public jurisdiction by
possessing the psychological capacities that enable them to participate with
minimal competence in legal and political institutions and to exercise self-
determination in light of their comprehensive doctrines in the nonpublic
domain. Individuals qualify as minimally competent for these purposes
only if they have the capacities needed to engage in a process of practical
reasoning that enables them to function adequately under the law in
ordinary circumstances. Minimally competent practical reasoning for this
purpose requires the ability to understand the rules, the circumstances, and
the actor's preferences and priorities as well as the ability to deliberate on
this understanding in order to reason to a plan of action in light of the likely
consequences.58
The criminal justice system of a liberal society protects equal standing
and individual self-determination by proscribing and punishing conduct
that violates protected rights and interests. Thus, the criminal law regulates
cooperative social interaction in the public jurisdiction, and it articulates the
boundaries of the nonpublic domain by proscribing specified types of
intrusions as crimes.59 Criminal justice systems, such as those in the United
States and other countries in the liberal tradition, are at least minimally
retributive in that they limit criminal conviction and punishment to those
who violate a law while meeting systemic standards of criminal
responsibility. Criminal responsibility requires, for example, that the
defendant fulfills the voluntary act and specified culpability requirements
and lacks any impairment that would ground an excuse.60 Those who
violate a law under these minimally retributivist conditions deserve
conviction and punishment in that they violate the criminal law while
<7 See id. §§ 5-6, at 29-40.
« See generally SCHOPP, supra note 36, at 108-28, 188-201, 251-60 (discussing action,
psychopathology, free wiII, and practical reasoning).
') Some activities might be criminalized for other reasons. PeIjury, for example, is proscribed in
order to promote the effectiveness of the legal system, and securities regulations are designed to
promote effective functioning of the economy. Crimes such as those against person and property,
however, help to define the individual's sphere of autonomy by forbidding others from intruding into
those areas.
" See generally MPC, supra note 25, §§ 2.01, 2.02, 4.01 (discussing voluntary nature of an act,
culpability, and mental disease or defect). Minimally retributive theories and institutions are those that
require culpability by systemic standards as a necessary condition for the justification of punishment
Some might argue that these systems are, or ought to be, retributive in a stronger sense. I take no
position on that issue for the purpose of this paper.
320 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 10:2
possessing the capacities necessary to participate in the public jurisdiction
through a process of competent practical reasoning.61
B. ACCOUNTABLE AGENCY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Competent practical reasoners qualify as criminally responsible in the
criminal justice process of a liberal society because they possess capacities
that enable them to participate in the criminal justice system as an
institution of behavior control uniquely appropriate to unimpaired adult
human beings. These individuals have the capacities to comprehend the
substantive prohibitions of the criminal law and the relevant circumstances.
Thus, they can understand that certain conduct violates the prohibitions of
the system and anticipate that such conduct will elicit aversive
consequences in the form of criminal punishment. They can also make use
of this knowledge in the process of practical reasoning through which they
direct their behavior. In this manner, competent practical reasoners can
pursue their extended interests and values by participating in a rule-based
institution of social control through a process of deliberation that enables
them to direct their conduct according to anticipated consequences without
actually experiencing those consequences.62
This process of practical reasoning requires an awareness of self as an
identity that extends over time. An individual acts in a manner calculated to
attain future rewards or to avoid aversive consequences in the future
precisely because that person experiences himself as an extended identity
who maintains a relatively stable set of preferences and priorities over time.
Thus, Smith acts now in a manner calculated to elicit rewards or avoid
aversive consequences at some future time precisely because he identifies
the Smith who will experience those future consequences as himself, and
he expects himself at that future time to retain certain preferences and
priorities that establish these consequences as either positive or aversive.63
Recall, for example, your response to the desires to kick the television off
the stand and to strangle your kids.64 Your appeals to your own extended
interests and principles were effective means for constraining and directing
your conduct partially because you understood them as yours. You
refrained from kicking the television and strangling your kids by calling
upon your own future interests in having a television, not having to pay for
61 See SCHOPP, supra note 36, at 251-260.
62 See id. at 218-61. This interpretation does not require that the individual could have done other
than he or she did, and it takes no position regarding causal determinism.
•, The claim here is not, of course, that Smith could not act in the interest of others or that all acts
are necessarily selfish. The point is only that when people act in an ordinary, prudential manner
intended to promote their future interests and avoid future difficulties, they do so partially because they
have a sense of self as an identity that extends over time and some relatively stable set of preferences
and priorities.
.. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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a new television, and avoiding arrest. That is, you understood yourself as an
entity with an identity and interests that extend into the future.
When you first entered the house, you were angry and preoccupied
with the frustrations of the day and of the moment. You were not
consciously aware of your standing desires to keep your television for the
foreseeable future, to avoid paying for a new one, or to avoid arrest. Yet,
experiencing the temptation to kick the television and strangle your kids
elicited conscious awareness of these standing wants. Ordinary adults with
intact consciousness and unimpaired cognitive processes maintain a
complex awareness of themselves, their environment, and their relationship
to that environment. Their immediate circumstances and purposes direct
their attention to a relatively small subset of their beliefs and wants, but
they have access to the broader set of beliefs and wants through the
associative process.65 Thus, experiencing the desire to engage in a pattern of
conduct, such as kicking the television or strangling your kids, triggers an
associative process through which the individual becomes aware of
important relevant beliefs, wants, interests, and values. Experiencing the
desire to kick the television brings to immediate awareness the desires to
continue to have a television and to avoid paying for a new one.
Experiencing the desire to strangle your kids elicits immediate
awareness of the desire to avoid arrest, the feeling of ongoing affection for
your kids, the commitment to personal responsibility and parenting, and a
variety of other interests and principles that you identify as part of your
extended sense of yourself. Competent adults manage relatively coherent
and adaptive lives partially because the deliberative process of practical
reasoning includes an associative process through which the individual
becomes aware of her beliefs, wants, interests, and commitments that are
most relevant to the circumstances she encounters and the actions she
contemplates. Her awareness of these important considerations enables her
to select a course of action in light of the circumstances, social and legal
constraints, and her own preferences and principles.66 By providing
awareness of one's self, one's environment, and the relationship between
the two, intact consciousness constitutes a critical ingredient in the set of
psychological capacities that enable unimpaired adults to direct their
conduct in light of legal constraints through a process of practical reasoning
and thus, to qualify for equal standing in the public jurisdiction and as
criminally responsible for criminal conduct.
" See SCHOPP, supra note 36, at 136-50.
", See id.
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C. IMPAIRED CONSCIOUSNESS AND ACCOUNTABLE AGENCY
Disturbance of consciousness undermines this unique status in a
manner that differentiates it from either ignorance or thought disorder.
Ignorance prevents the individual from bringing the capacities of practical
reasoning to bear on the decision to perform the conduct constituting the
objective elements of the offense, but it does not constitute any defect in
those capacities. Ignorance exculpates insofar as it negates an offense
element.67 Although individuals who act in ignorance that negates an
offense element act as a competent practical reasoners, they do not perform
these offenses as competent practical reasoners. Suppose, for example, that
Jones purchases a package of artificial sweetener in which the manufacturer
has accidentally placed sugar rather than the artificial substitute indicated
by the label. Jones then serves the contents to a diabetic guest, representing
it as the artificial sweetener she reasonably believes it to be, and the guest
suffers a diabetic coma. Jones fulfills the objective offense elements of
assault in that she engaged in conduct that caused bodily injury to her
guest, but her ignorance precludes the required culpability element of
purpose, knowledge, or recklessness.63 Jones acted with the capacities of a
competent practical reasoner but without awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely effects. Intuitively, many people might say of
Jones, "she didn't realize what she was doing." Thus, the behavior she
deliberately performed did not bear the relation required by the offense
definition to the harm she caused.69
The insanity defense exculpates agents who engaged in criminal
conduct due to certain types of serious psychological impairment. Suppose
that Jones knowingly served sugar to her diabetic guest because she
experienced psychotic disturbance of thought and perception such that she
heard a hallucinatory voice ordering her to do so. She understood this voice
as the voice of God telling her that the guest was possessed by Satan and
that she could save the guest's soul from Satan only by serving the guest
the sugar that would induce a lethal coma but purify her soul with God's
grace contained in the pure white granules of sugar. In these circumstances,
some people might say that Jones did not "really" know what she was
doing. Jones knew, however, that she was serving the guest sugar, that the
guest was diabetic, and that the sugar would induce a lethal coma. Thus,
she knew all she needed to know in order to fulfill the offense elements for
murder.70
67 See MPC, supra note 25, § 2.04(l)(a); ROBINSON, supra note 25, § 62(d).
.. MPC, supra note 25, § 211.1(1)(a).
" See SCHOPP, supra note 36, at 94-108.
70 See generally MPC, supra note 25, § 210.2 (setting out the elements of criminal homicide).
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This case differs from clear cases of exculpatory ignorance in that
Jones acted with the knowledge required by the offense elements, but in
deciding to perform the criminal act, she lacked the ability to engage in the
process of practical reasoning characteristic of a responsible participant in
the public jurisdiction. Intuitively, many people might say of Jones that
"she knew what she was doing, but she did it because she was crazy."
Although common standards frame the defense in terms of the ability to
know or appreciate the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of the conduct,
these standards misclassify some cases and misrepresent the basis for the
defense because they conflate the exculpatory significance of ignorance
with that of impairment of the capacities of practical reasoning required for
criminal responsibility.71
Defendants who claim that they did not fulfill the voluntary act
requirement advance a fundamentally different exculpatory rationale than
those involved in claims of ignorance or insanity.72 If Jones caused bodily
injury to another person when she fell into that person as a result of an
unexpected seizure, she would deny culpability by claiming that she had
not engaged in a voluntary act.73 Intuitively, many people might say of
Jones that "she couldn't help it." Her movement was not an act because the
ordinary connection between behavior and the psychological processes of
decisionmaking was severed. Although Jones' body moved, that movement
was not produced by her psychological processes of practical reasoning in
the manner that these processes ordinarily produce action. Stated
intuitively, Jones' body moved, but Jones did not do anything. Rather, the
seizure was an event that happened to her.74 Thus, the seizure movement
does not constitute an act because it was not produced by her psychological
processes of practical reasoning and decisionmaking. Because seizure
movements do not constitute acts, they provide clear examples of a
category of behavior that does not qualify as an exercise of accountable
agency.
Compare the relatively clear cases involving seizures with the forms of
impaired consciousness discussed in Part V, including post-ictal states,
somnambulism, and hypoglycemia. In each case, the defendant behaved in
an apparently directed, organized, purposeful, and environmentally
responsive manner. Yet, impaired consciousness elicits the intuitive
" See generally SCHOPP, supra note 36, at 160-217 (discussing the insanity defense).
72 The point here is to clarify the exculpatory significance of the types of impairment ordinarily
addressed under this requirement and not to argue that the current classification of such claims as a
failure of proof defense is most appropriate.
7> See MPC, supra note 25, § 2.01. Some would contend that "voluntary act" is redundant because
acts must be voluntary in order to qualify as acts. Here, I use "voluntary acts" in order to make clear
that I am referring to acts that fulfill the MPC's voluntary act requirement and the similar traditional
requirement of criminal responsibility.
14 See generally SCHOPP, supra note 36, at 94-108 (discussing involuntary actions and culpability).
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judgment that "she wasn't herself when she did it." She lacked access to
herself in the sense that she was not able to engage in a process of
deliberation that included an associative process that would provide her
with access to the extended set of beliefs, desires, interests, and principles
that constitute her extended identity. Thus, she was unable to engage in the
ordinary process of deliberation through which competent adults direct
their conduct in light of anticipated external consequences and self-
evaluation by appeal to their own principles and values.75 Due to this failure
of the associative process that ordinarily provides access to her extended
identity as a participant in the public jurisdiction, she did not act as an
accountable agent by the standards of the criminal justice system. When
she acted, she knew what she was doing, but she did not know herself.
According to this interpretation, the voluntary act requirement
articulates the traditional requirement that the behavior for which a person
is held criminally responsible must represent an exercise of the capacities
of accountable agency that fulfill a necessary condition for participation as
an equal in the legal institutions that order the public jurisdiction. Behavior
fulfills this requirement when the individual produces the behavior through
the exercise of psychological processes that include an associative process
that provides access to the individual's extended identity as a participant in
the public jurisdiction of the liberal society.
Movement produced by seizure represents a relatively clear case of
behavior that does not fulfill the voluntary act requirement because the
movement occurs independently of the decisionmaking process that
initiates action as an exercise of accountable agency. Thus, the behavior
cannot be attributed to the individual in his status as an accountable
participant in the legal institutions that order the public jurisdiction. Some
behaviors associated with other forms of impaired consciousness, such as
that experienced during a post-ictal or hypoglycemic state, involve a
decision to engage in organized, directed, and environmentally responsive
conduct. Yet, the decision to engage in that conduct is disassociated from
the extended self that qualifies for participation in the public jurisdiction as
an accountable agent. The point here is not merely that the act was out of
character for the defendant. Rather, the decision to act was made without
access to the person's character. That is, the individual engaged in conduct
without access to the extended and integrated consciousness that forms the
person's extended identity and enables him to participate in the public
jurisdiction as an accountable agent by the criteria of the criminal law as
the primary behavior-directing institution of the public domain in a liberal
society.
" See id. at 150-58.
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DID, like any other serious form of impaired consciousness, should
exculpate if, and only if, it precludes attribution of the conduct constituting
the offense to the defendant in his capacity as an accountable agent in the
public domain. Although an individual engages in purposeful behavior, we
cannot impute that conduct to this person as an accountable agent unless
the defendant acted with access to the extended consciousness that enables
this person to function as a participant in the public jurisdiction of the
liberal society.
Wormwood-as-Slick lacks access to the inhibitory aspects of himself
because these components of Wormwood are encapsulated in his as-
Smedley consciousness. Wormwood-as-Slick resembles an individual in a
post-ictal state or similar condition of impaired consciousness in that he
acts upon certain emotions, desires, and perceptions without access to the
larger set of psychological states that constitute his extended identity and
enable him to participate in the public jurisdiction as an accountable agent.
The illegal conduct does not represent Wormwood as a participant in the
public domain because as Slick, he lacks access to those aspects of himself
that enable him to inhibit and direct conduct in the context of the criminal
system of behavior control by appeal to the inhibitory prudential and moral
interests that are part of Wormwood's extended identity as a citizen of the
public jurisdiction and as a subject of the criminal justice system.
Wormwood-as-Smedley has access to these inhibitory components.
Like any other accountable agent, he may fail to make use of them in order
to conform his conduct to law in a particular situation. If Wormwood
commits an offense as Smedley, his impairment of consciousness does not
preclude criminal responsibility because lack of access to the as-Slick
component of his consciousness does not deprive Wormwood-as-Smedley
of access to any components of self that Wormwood would exercise in the
process of practical reasoning in order to conform with the limits set by the
criminal justice system.
In summary, the molar analysis integrates the clinical account of DID
as a disorder of consciousness with the principles of criminal responsibility
in a liberal society. Wormwood suffers from impaired consciousness that
precludes criminal conviction and punishment for crimes committed as
Slick because his impairment prevents him from participating in the public
jurisdiction through a process of practical reasoning with access to the
inhibitory components of his identity that would enable him to direct his
conduct as an accountable agent. The next Section argues that only
Wormwood qualifies as an accountable agent in the public jurisdiction; that
is, Wormwood's alters do not qualify as independent foci for evaluation of
criminal responsibility.
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D. MULTIPLES AS ACCOUNTABLE AGENTS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Recall the case of Guido-Beneficence.76 That case unambiguously
raises concerns regarding disposition rather than criminal responsibility.
Guido is clearly guilty of the crime, while Mother Beneficence is clearly
innocent, and it seems impossible to subject Guido to ordinary criminal
punishment without injuring Mother Beneficence. At first glance, the
critical distinction between this case and that of Wormwood seems to
involve consistent conscious control of a body. Guido and Mother
Beneficence each maintain constant command of a body, but Wormwood's
alters each have only intermittent control of a body. Consider, however,
persons with seizure disorders and ordinary healthy people during sleep.
These conditions also involve periods of time during which the person
lacks conscious control of the body, yet these persons remain accountable
agents regarding any conduct performed during the periods of conscious
control. If one thinks of Smedley and Slick as analogous to individuals in
these conditions, it seems that each alter would be responsible for conduct
performed while that alter was in control, and DID would raise only
dispositional concerns. Yet, Wormwood seems to differ from Guido-
Beneficence partially because DID raises serious questions of criminal
responsibility and not merely of disposition.
One might suggest that these conditions differ in the following manner.
Regarding seizure disorders or sleep, either the individual has conscious
command of the body or no one has such command. In Wormwood's case,
in contrast, sometimes as-Smedley has control of the body, and sometimes
as-Slick has conscious command of the same body. According to this
interpretation, the critical distinction between DID and seizure disorder or
sleep lies in the pattern of alternating control of the same body by different
centers of consciousness.
Consider, however, an analogous case involving Siamese twins.
Assume that the Smith twins (Susan and Sally) have distinct heads and
upper bodies that join at the hips into a single lower body. Assume further
that psychologically each is a distinct and unimpaired adult. Each has
independent conscious command of her own upper body, but they share
command of their common lower body. Either can move their common
legs, for example, if the other does not resist.TI Suppose that Susan becomes
angry at a third person and kicks that person with no cooperation from
Sally and no warning to Sally. Susan has committed an assault by use of a
limb that either she or Sally can independently command, but Sally took no
76 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
77 This description is designed for expository purposes. I make no claim that it reflects the
conditions experienced by any actual people.
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part in the decision to commit the assault and was unaware that Susan
planned to do so until the assault occurred.78 This case resembles
Wormwood insofar as each of two distinct centers of consciousness
sometimes commands the same body. Yet, it seems clear that this case
resembles Guido-Beneficence rather than Wormwood regarding the
intuitive judgment of responsibility. That is, Susan is clearly guilty, and
Sally is clearly innocent. This case, like that of Guido-Beneficence, raises a
difficult problem of disposition rather than a question regarding criminal
responsibility.
In summary, Wormwood represents an intuitively difficult case for
judgments of criminal responsibility. Guido-Beneficence and the Siamese
twins represent difficult dispositional problems, but they do not appear to
raise difficult questions regarding criminal responsibility. The comparison
to seizure disorders and sleep demonstrates that the difficult questions
regarding Wormwood's responsibility do not arise from the mere fact of
intermittent consciousness on the part of each alter. The comparison to the
Siamese twins demonstrates that the questions regarding Wormwood's
responsibility do not arise from the mere fact that different centers of
consciousness sometimes command the same bodily movements.
For the purpose of evaluating criminal responsibility, the central
distinction between Wormwood and either Guido-Beneficence or the
Siamese twins involves the presence of independent and intact centers of
consciousness. Guido, Mother Beneficence, Susan, and Sally each
represent an intact and independent center of consciousness, but as-
Smedley and as-Slick do not. Although some alters demonstrate some
memory, knowledge, or skills that other alters lack, a multiple's alters also
share substantial memory, knowledge, and skills. Each alter represents a
dominant affective state with related desires, memory, and beliefs, but each
also manifests a substantial body of neutral background psychology shared
by the various alters.79 Alters tend to take command or recede from
consciousness in response to emotionally relevant stimuli. That is, each
alter represents a dominant affective state, and each alter either assumes
consciousness or recedes from consciousness as psychological or
environmental stimuli elicit various affective responses.80 Thus, the subset
of Wormwood's consciousness that commands the body fluctuates and is
largely responsive to emotionally laden cues.
Multiples resemble ordinary accountable agents insofar as
psychological and situational cues elicit emotional responses. Multiples
"' See generally MPC, supra note 25, § 211.1(l)(a) (setting out the elements of simple assault
charge).
" See supra notes 10 and 30 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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differ from ordinary accountable agents, however, in that these emotional
responses alter the available range of consciousness. Emotionally laden
cues alter not only the multiple's emotional state but also the range of
consciousness to which the multiple has access. The unimpaired individual
responds to emotionally laden cues with emotional responses that can alter
the content and intensity of that person's wants, but that person retains
associational access to a relatively stable set of wants, beliefs, interests, and
principles that provide that person's extended sense of self. Although the
emotional cues might trigger strong immediate tendencies to engage in
certain conduct, the individual retains access to that complex sense of his or
her extended identity in the context of legal contingencies as resources for
use in directing his or her conduct. Thus, that agent has the opportunity to
call upon that extended set of central personal concerns in directing his or
her conduct in light of the situational factors, including the legal
ramificationsofvarioustypesofbeha~oL
Recall, for example, your desire to kick the television and strangle your
kids.81 You directed your conduct away from uninhibited action on the
desire and toward a modified plan of action by appeal to a variety of
relevant interests and principles. The emotionally laden circumstances
elicited an unusually intense emotional response, but that emotional
response did not deprive you of associational access to the broader and
relatively stable set of wants, beliefs, interests and principles that constitute
your extended awareness of yourself. Conscious awareness of this sense of
self played a critical role in the process of deliberation through which you
inhibited the immediate inclination and redirected your conduct toward a
less destructive course of action. You directed your conduct through a
process of practical reasoning that called upon accurate reality testing,
unimpaired reasoning, and the complex set of interests and principles
contained in your extended identity. Had you had access only to a limited
state of consciousness that contained your immediate perceptions,
emotional state, and behavioral inclinations, but not your inhibitory beliefs,
interests, and principles, you could not have redirected your conduct
through the same process.
Individuals who possess a relatively stable set of wants, beliefs,
interests, and principles can pursue these central concerns within the legal
structure, making use of them in order to direct their conduct in light of
these concerns and legal contingencies. Those who possess widely
fluctuating sets of concerns can direct their conduct in a manner likely to
accommodate their changing concerns.
" See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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At first glance, the multiple might seem analogous to an unimpaired
individual with a widely fluctuating set of interests and principles in that
the multiple's central concerns vary across alters. The unimpaired
individual with unsettled interests or principles differs from the multiple in
two crucial respects. First, in contrast to Wormwood-as-Smedley, the
unimpaired individual is aware that her concerns fluctuate. Second, in
contrast to Wormwood-as-Slick, she is aware that the full set of central
concerns is hers; that is, she understands that she is the person who
experiences these fluctuations. Thus, she can direct her behavior in light of
this awareness that her central concerns fluctuate, just as people often make
decisions in conditions of uncertainty regarding many other circumstances.
Wormwood, in contrast, is unaware of his as-Slick aspect during the as-
Smedley periods, and during his as-Slick periods he is unaware that the as-
Smedley concerns are his. Thus, in each aspect of consciousness.
Wormwood lacks the ability to bring the full range of his own central
concerns to bear on the process of directing his behavior through the
process of practical reasoning in light of the legal contingencies. As
Smedley, he lacks access to his own anger and to his aggressive
dispositions, but as Slick, he lacks access to his interests and principles that
would otherwise serve to facilitate compliance with the law.
Law provides an institutional structure within which competent adults
can participate in the public jurisdiction in such a manner as to influence
legal limits on their liberty through the political process, avoid unwanted
state intrusion, and preserve their discretion in the nonpublic domain.82 In
order to work effectively, this structure requires at least minimal
consistency of two types. First, the legal system must provide relatively
consistent legal contingencies such that individuals can direct their conduct
in the public jurisdiction through practical reasoning in light of at least
minimally predictable legal consequences. Second, individuals must have
relatively stable abilities to engage in practical reasoning regarding the
significance of those relatively consistent legal rules for their central
concerns and to direct their conduct through that process of practical
reasoning. When these two conditions are obtained, individuals can predict,
and to a substantial degree influence, the degree and type of state intrusion
into their lives. In this manner, they can function effectively in the public
jurisdiction and pursue their individual lives in the public and nonpublic
jurisdictions.
Alters cannot participate effectively in this structure because they do
not maintain a consistent consciousness or consistent command of the
conduct in which their bodies engage when they are not in control. In order
to function effectively in the public jurisdiction, individuals must engage in
" See discussion supra Part VI.A.
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a process of competent practical reasoning in light of the legal
contingencies and their own extended identities. Because alters assume or
lose consciousness and command of their bodies in response to a variety of
conditions that elicit various emotional states and because their bodies can
elicit state intrusion by engaging in conduct under the command of
different consciousnesses, alters cannot consistently predict and manage the
degree and manner of state intrusion to which they are subject.
Consider the manner in which various other actors compare to alters in
this regard. Guido-Beneficence provides a clear case in which Guido and
Mother Beneficence each function as a consistent consciousness and a
competent practical reasoner. Thus, each functions as an accountable agent,
although their current circumstances create a dispositional problem. A
quadriplegic person has very little command of his body, but he maintains a
consistent consciousness that commands any conduct, such as soliciting
another to commit a crime, that might elicit state intrusion. One who
engages in criminal conduct as a result of psychosis or severe retardation
maintains a consistent consciousness and consistent command of any
conduct that might elicit state intrusion. Thus, her conduct fulfills the
voluntary act requirement because it constitutes an exercise of accountable
agency. She fails to qualify as criminally responsible, however, because she
does not direct that conduct through competent practical reasoning.
An individual who is subject to grand mal seizures does not act as an
accountable agent during the seizures because she has no conscious control
of her bodily movement. She would qualify as an accountable agent
between seizures, but the seizure movements do not qualify as exercises of
accountable agency. An individual who is subject to unpredictable and
uncontrollable seizures would be accountable for engaging in conduct, such
as driving a car, that created an unreasonable risk when a seizure occurred.
She would be accountable for that conduct precisely because the act of
driving the car would constitute an exercise of accountable agency.
Although alters are also subject to unpredictable variations in
consciousness through switching, they differ in two important ways from
the individual who is subject to unpredictable seizures. First, some alters
are not aware that they are subject to variations of consciousness. Smedley
is unaware that Slick sometimes replaces him as the consciousness in
control of the body, and although Slick is aware that Smedley sometimes
controls the body, he is not aware that he and Smedley represent different
aspects of Wormwood's consciousness. Second, Smedley lacks the ability
to refrain from creating risk to others because he lacks the ability to
consciously direct the process of switching to the Slick alter. Indeed, if a
society were to recognize alters as participants in the public jurisdiction,
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switching would not involve merely a variation in consciousness; it would
involve the unpredictable substitution of one citizen for another.
One can imagine circumstances in which Wormwood-as-Smedley
would assume the standing of accountable agency analogous to that of the
person with unpredictable seizures. Suppose that Wormwood-as-Smedley
became aware of his as-Slick aspect and developed the ability to direct the
switching process. In these circumstances, Wormwood would have the
ability to deliberately maintain consciousness and control of his body as
Smedley or to allow his as-Slick aspect to take over consciousness and
control of his body. Thus, Wormwood-as-Smedley would stand in a
position analogous to that of the person subject to unpredictable seizures
insofar as each would be aware that engaging in certain conduct would
create unjustifiable risk to third parties. In these circumstances,
Wormwood-as-Smedley would qualify as an accountable agent because he
would have the ability to retain command of his body in a state of
consciousness that allows access to his inhibitory assets. Switching
consciousness would constitute reckless conduct, because switching would
create substantial risk, and it would be an act he performed with access to
his inhibitory dispositions in his as-Smedley aspect of consciousness, rather
than an event that happened to him. Thus, Wormwood-as-Smedley would
qualify as an accountable agent, and should he cede consciousness to his
as-Slick aspect and perform criminal conduct in his as-Slick aspect, he
could be guilty of recklessly committing that crime.83 This account
addresses Wormwood-as-Smedley as the accountable agent; however, it
does not address the alters as accountable agents.
According to the usual account of DID, alters differ from Wormwood-
as-Smedley in these hypothetical circumstances precisely because alters are
not aware that they have other aspects of consciousness as part of
themselves, and they are usually unable to reliably predict or direct their
changes of consciousness. According to the usual description of DID and
the analysis advanced here, Wormwood-as-Smedley would be an
accountable agent for conduct performed in his as-Smedley aspect because
he commits the criminal conduct as an exercise of agency with access to
Wormwood's inhibitory processes. He is not accountable for ceding
consciousness to as-Slick because that change of consciousness is
something that happens to Wormwood in response to affectively laden cues
rather than an exercise of agency. He is not accountable for criminal
conduct performed as Slick because in that aspect of consciousness he
lacks access to his inhibitory processes. Thus, the question is always
whether Wormwood acts in a state of consciousness in which he qualifies
" See MPC, supra note 25, § 2.02(2)(c) (discussing recklessness).
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as an accountable agent; it is not whether Smedley and Slick are
accountable agents.
Consider once more the Siamese twins: Susan, who committed the
assault, and Sally, who did not. Recall the assumptions that Susan and Sally
constitute independent consciousnesses and that each independently directs
the movement of her upper body but that either can direct the movement of
the common lower body. IfSusan had simply picked up a knife and stabbed
someone with an arm that was solely within her capacity to direct, this case
would present comparable circumstances to those presented by Guido-
Beneficence in that an accountable agent committed a crime in
circumstances that created a dispositional problem because criminal
punishment would injure an innocent party. That Susan committed an
assault by the use of a leg that either Susan or Sally can direct does not
change the conclusion regarding accountable agency. Although either
Susan or Sally can direct this limb in some instances, this particular kick
was a bodily movement directed by an exercise of Susan's intact
consciousness. This kick was an exercise of accountable agency by Susan,
and the problem remains a dispositional one.84
The cases involving sleep, seizure disorder, and the Siamese twins
demonstrate that accountable agency is not simply a matter of having
constant and exclusive control of bodily movement. Rather, the central
issue involves the relationship between the bodily movement that fulfIlls
the objective elements of an offense and an intact and independent
consciousness. Alters fail to qualify as accountable agents because they are
not intact and are not independent consciousnesses. Rather, they are subject
to unpredictable switching in response to affectively laden circumstances
involving environmental cues, the psychological states and processes
represented by each alter, and the psychological states and processes shared
by the various alters. Alters cannot qualify for equal standing in the public
jurisdiction because this vulnerability to switching renders them unable to
participate consistently in the public jurisdiction in light of legal
contingencies and their own wants, beliefs, interests, and principles.
Furthermore, this vulnerability is characteristic of the ordinary state of
alters rather than a pathological deviation from their ordinary state. Thus, if
.. Professor Saks raises the question regarding the manner in which we would address criminal
responsibility and punishment in a world populated entirely by Siamese twins. SAKS WITH BEHNKE,
supra note 2, at 71. This question invites extended reflection on the proper institutions of social control
for such a world, but I suspect that the initial step in that process of reflection is fairly clear. Simply put,
we would have different institutions of social control representing different principles of responsibility.
Legal institutions representing liberal principles of political morality and corresponding principles of
criminal responsibility purport to establish a justifiable political structure for human beings that are
roughly similar to those that fall within a broad range of familiar conditions. There is no obvious reason
to expect that the same principles or legal institutions would be justified if important properties of
individuals or of their circumstances were significantly different.
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the liberal state acknowledged alters as equal participants in the public
jurisdiction, it would recognize those alters as qualified for a role that their
ordinary condition rendered them unable to fulfill.
Those who suffer from seizures or psychotic episodes qualify as
participants in the public jurisdiction during their periods of intact
functioning. Such individuals differ from alters in that the state can address
them as participants in the public jurisdiction during intact periods while
recognizing their periods of dysfunction as pathological deviations from
intact functioning. Alters, in contrast, are vulnerable to switching with
other alters as part of their ordinary condition as alters. If the liberal society
recognized alters as participants in the public jurisdiction, then barring
severe collateral psychopathology in some alters, the state cannot treat
those alters as suffering pathological processes analogous to seizures or
psychotic episodes. Doing so would imply the contradictory premises that
alters both do and do not possess the capacities required to qualify for equal
standing in the public domain. That is, according to the molecular
approach, each alter qualifies as an equal participant in the public
jurisdiction. Yet, due to their vulnerability to switching, neither has the
ability to consistently direct conduct in the public jurisdiction through a
process of practical reasoning in light of legal contingencies and his own
identity. Thus, alters possess the capacities required to qualify for equal
standing in the public domain, and they do not. In contrast, for those who
suffer from seizures or episodic psychosis, the seizures or psychotic
episodes represent pathological deviations from the intact state that
qualifies them as participants in the public jurisdiction. Thus, a liberal
society cannot adopt the molecular approach precisely because doing so
attributes accountable agency in the public jurisdiction to alters who cannot
function in that capacity due to their vulnerability to switching.
The molar approach, in contrast, recognizes Wormwood as the agent.
When Wormwood commits a crime as Smedley, he acts as an accountable
agent in the public jurisdiction because his impairment of consciousness
does not deprive him of access to psychological states or processes that he
would use to inhibit his criminal inclination in light of legal contingencies.
Wormwood-as-Slick does not qualify as an accountable agent because he
lacks access to aspects of his consciousness that Wormwood would exercise
in order to comply with the law. Access to those inhibitory aspects of
consciousness enables the accountable agent to avoid state intervention by
directing his life in compliance with the law through a process of practical
reasoning.
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The clinical core of DID consists of fragmentation of the ordinarily
integrated functions of consciousness and memory. Those who commit
criminal offenses while suffering DID raise complex questions of criminal
responsibility. The molecular pattern of analysis obscures both the clinical
features of DID and the questions of criminal responsibility raised by the
disorder. The molar pattern of analysis illuminates the significance of DID
for criminal responsibility because it promotes interpretation of DID as one
form of impaired consciousness. In this manner, the molar approach also
clarifies the significance of impaired consciousness for the conception of
accountable agency appropriate to the public jurisdiction in a liberal
society. Thus, it illustrates the importance of integrating an understanding
of the clinical features of a purportedly exculpatory disorder with an
understanding of the principles of political morality represented by the
legal institutions of criminal responsibility.
Wormwood is criminally responsible for the crimes he commits as
Smedley, not because Smedley is responsible, but because Wormwood-as-
Smedley suffers no impairment of consciousness that deprives him of
access to inhibitory processes ordinarily exercised by Wormwood and by
other accountable agents in the public jurisdiction. Wormwood is not
criminally responsible for the crimes he commits as Slick, not because
Slick is not responsible, but because Wormwood-as-Slick suffers from
impairment of consciousness that deprives him of access to Wormwood's
inhibitory processes. This interpretation also explains why exculpation of
Wormwood for conduct performed as a psychopathic alter does not entail
exculpation of a psychopath. Unlike Wormwood-as-Slick, a psychopath
suffers no impairment of consciousness.85
os See Robert F. Schopp & Andrew J. Slain, Psychopathy, Criminal Responsibility, and Civil
Commitment As a Sexual Predator, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 247 (2000), for a substantive analysis of the
criminal responsibility of psychopaths.
